Although the scope of the right to culture has never been more recognized nor clarified, culture itself is currently portrayed in some human rights narratives as a tool of oppression and an obstacle to human rights, especially women's rights. Certainly, cultural rationalizations that justify human rights violations and the misappropriation of culture by dominant (male) elites put a dent in the recognition of collective cultural rights. However, the article argues that the binary understanding of universality versus culture and collective cultural rights ultimately harms women's rights, as such understanding does not reflect all women's experiences, priorities, and strategies. The article uses the example of indigenous women to highlight the importance of culture for some women. It suggests a paradigm shift from portraying minority and indigenous women as victims of their cultures to pushing for their empowerment through and beyond their cultures. In essence, the piece advocates for a multilayered, nuanced approach on women's rights that addresses universalism but also considers postcolonial feminist and anthropological critiques of human rights.
I. INTRODUCTION
To mark the seventieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, Karima Bennoune, published a report that stresses the centrality of universalism in 1 The report strongly urges states, academics, and civil society to reinforce the message of universality in human rights debates. 2 At several points in past decades, the universality debate of human rights appeared to be settled. Starting with the dominance of the liberal view of human rights, critical approaches to universality were fiercely injected into the debate in the 1990s; whereas the 2000s saw the attention turning more on the application of the relevant human rights in particular situations. 3 However, trying to find the balance between universalism and cultural diversity is no easy task, as it relates to our understanding of the human rights system: its foundations, its mandates, and its priorities. From populist concerns about migration on one hand and the recent emphasis on cultural diversity in international law on the other, claims to reaffirm universality as the undisputed queen of the human rights system have intensified once again.
Both universality and cultural diversity are at the core of human rights, and doing justice to both requires a nuanced, multilayered, and multidisciplinary response. This article acknowledges the catastrophic effects of using "cultural rationalizations" to justify human rights abuses, 4 but, it urges both scholars and practitioners to push back on current attempts to demonize cultures in human rights debates. It argues that the binary vision of culture versus women's rights is overly simplistic and ultimately harms women's rights, particularly-though not only-the rights of migrant, minority, and indigenous women.
This article uses the example of indigenous women to demonstrate the importance that cultural rights have for some women around the world and that the misuse of culture should not deter the wave of recognition of cultural rights. By bringing together scholarship from multiple disciplines and theoretical frameworks, this article employs a postcolonial analysis and intersectionality to maintain that, like cultures, universalism has also restricted rights. Policies based on perceptions of cultures as essentially detrimental to women eat away the rights of migrant, minority, and indigenous women because these policies promote stereotypes that undermine them. However, policies focusing on the patriarchy that suppresses non-European women, also cause white women to push aside the patriarchy that affects them, subsequently undercutting the rights of both groups.
My approach is influenced by Christopher McCrudden's appeal to pay more attention to "dialogic and dialectic processes that embrace sustained and reflexive contestation, pluralism, judicial institutions, and social activism." 5 McCrudden proposes "a partial détente between philosophical theories" on human rights.
6 "An analysis of international human rights law," he maintains, "must take this complexity into account if a coherent and convincing explanation of the normativity of international human rights law is to stand any chance of being identified." 7 McCrudden has mainly used his approach on the debate of human dignity. In this piece, I transpose this approach to the current debate on women's rights and cultural rights, and I maintain that continuing on the path of so called qualified, 8 inclusive, 9 soft, 10 or relative 11 universalism may better reflect the current viewpoints of international human rights law.
In essence, I argue that only by using both the universalist and postcolonial messages, acquiring an understanding of all streams of feminisms, and using both legal and anthropological considerations, can we begin to get closer to realizing the rights of the wonderfully diverse women around the world. Otherwise, the universalism we attempt to implement smells of parochialism. I also use the principle of subsidiarity as put forward by Paolo Carozza to help mediate the multiple approaches in human rights. 12 The explosion of subsidiarity in EU law in the 1990s and its use by some federal states has not been reflected in international law debates until very recently. Defined as "a rebuttable presumption for the local,"
13 subsidiarity requires decision-making to take place at a lower level unless good reasons exist to refer it to higher authorities.
14 I use subsidiarity to argue that decisions about the inconsistency of certain cultural practices must first be taken by 5 the women themselves, rather than by technocrats and experts. Subsidiarity has limitations that I also discuss.
II. THE DEMONIZATION OF CULTURE(S)
For some time, liberalists have been reluctant to accept the collective element of the right to culture, as they emphasize the importance of human agency and autonomy. 15 Religious and cultural attachments, they have argued, have no place in the public sphere and should not be acknowledged nor recognised by the state. 16 In 1993, Rhoda Howard declared that "[c]ultural absolutism is . . . the position that declares a society's culture to be of supreme ethical value,"
17 which for her is deeply problematic. To a large degree, because of liberal concerns, the right to culture was ignored for many decades.
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In the 2000s, minority and indigenous peoples all around the world rejoiced; the collective element of the right to culture was recognized, which reflected their own experiences and needs. The most glaring recognition of collective cultural rights came in the form of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; in a document that goes beyond the force of a [T]he right of everyone-alone, or in association with others or as a community-to act freely, to choose his or her own identity, to identify or not with one or several communities or to change that choice, to take part in the political life of society, to engage in one's own cultural practices and to express oneself in the language of one's choice.
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Recognition of collective aspects of cultural rights have also come from the most unexpected sources; the World Bank, famous for its reluctance to refer to any human rights, now recognizes in 
Particularly, S.A.S. v. France
35 has clarified that on religious clothing, the choice of the minority woman will not be respected, no matter how educated, articulate, and free she is, if it is not in accordance with Western values of secularism. In contrast to what was envisaged a decade ago, Elsa Stamatopoulou's statement that cultural rights continue to evoke "the scary spectrum of group identities and group rights" 36 still rings true.
III. THE NON-WESTERN WOMAN AS "THE OTHER"
At the same time that the liberals call for the universality of human rights, they also proclaim that human rights values are European values. 37 The Europeanization discourse of human rights maintains and increases the artificial gap between "us," the Europeans who represent the noble values of gender equality and female emancipation, and the "others." "We," the Europeans, need cultural rights, whereas "they," the migrants, minorities, and indigenous peoples, claim cultural rights to preserve their traditional practices. Leti Volpp has noted: "Those with power appear to have no culture; those without power are culturally endowed. Western subjects are defined by their abilities to make choices, in contrast to Third World subjects, who are defined by their group-based determinism."
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In "critiquing the cultural engineering that has relentlessly promoted the covering of women," 39 the Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights noted:
Some restrictive garments are said in certain instances to represent a freelychosen personal conviction that such "modesty" is required by the teachings of a particular religion. If so, this is a choice of a particular interpretation of any faith, and one which is relentlessly promoted by fundamentalists. One must respect the agency of adults. However, women's dress may be heavily impacted by discrimination against women and fundamentalist propaganda, especially in the mass media and sermons. and #YoTambien, reminded the world that women's rights violations are not limited to non-European cultural traditions; patriarchal structures and discrimination exist in Western cultures as much as in non-Western ones. Even in this case, the link with the Western culture is not emphasized. In general, non-Western women are seen as vulnerable and in need of strong supporters. Kimberly Hutchings maintains that postcolonial theory points to the dominance of liberal ideology and its corresponding vocabulary, which articulates communicative encounters within the international sphere, and highlights its "exclusiveness and the inextricability from power relations." 41 In order to be heard, women are asked to adopt Western thought, reasoning, and language 42 and then use the given formal language and vocabulary to express their concerns and wishes. Paul Gready discusses how the experiences of victims in transitional justice settings are often lost as they try to adopt the specific format of communication that will make them heard. 43 In order to be heard, they need to "rework their stories in order to neatly fit into the categories and expectations established by transitional justice regimes." 44 Otherwise, the victims are viewed as not making sense, and Western society organizations are encouraged to help them understand the international setting of advocacy.
It has been rightly argued that negative representations of the "others" are "the main engine of current efforts to introduce neo-assimilationist policies." 45 As Gayatri Spivak notes, the "white men . . . saving brown women from brown men" narrative was important for the operation of-in this case-British colonialism. 46 Leila Ahmed has discussed how the British colonial authorities in Egypt relied on the rhetoric of women's emancipation for their colonial missions. 47 Western feminism became a "handmaiden to colonialism" in this process. 48 It has contributed to the common portrayal of non-Western women as victims of their cultures and it is for their interest that they should adopt Western values. 49 If they do not, the liberals cast doubt as to why this is the case. In her mission to Sweden that "some circles have also tried to reframe the issue of gender inequality . . . as a problem re-imported into equal Sweden through immigration from developing countries." 50 Although women's rights seem to have an important place in Swedish society, the effects of structural racial discrimination and colonialism are not at the center of current discussions. 51 More generally, several sociological studies support a widespread denial that racism and colonialism continue to be present and relevant in Europe. 52 
IV. SPECIFICALLY ON UNIVERSALITY
We all need equal and universal human rights to protect us. Both the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Declaration on Cultural Diversity 53 and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Declaration on Minorities) note that cultural diversity and cultural rights cannot infringe human rights guaranteed by international law. 54 It is important to accept that human rights bind everyone and that there can be no exceptions. Prohibition of discrimination, the right to expression, refugee rights, and the right to an adequate standard of living are recognized rights that bind signatory governments to relevant treaties irrespective of where they are and their circumstances.
Many non-Western scholars have demonstrated the universality of both the concept and the foundations of human rights. 55 Jack Donnelly notes that "it would seem inappropriate to adopt a theory that is inconsistent with the moral experience of almost all people-especially in the name of cultural sensitivity and diversity." 56 "Normative cultural relativism" he proclaims, "is a deeply problematic moral theory that offers a poor understanding of the relativity of human rights." 57 Thomas Eriksen notes "about cultural relativism, seen as an alternative not to morality but to moral universalism, it may be said that it stood for a radical humanism in the mid-20th century, a minority view towards the late 20th century, and an almost impossible position to defend in the early 21st century." 58 However, one must be very careful of misplaced universalism. Donnelly cautions:
The fact of cultural relativity and the doctrine of methodological cultural relativism are important antidotes to misplaced universalism. The fear of (neo-) imperialism and the desire to demonstrate cultural respect that lie behind many cultural relativist arguments need to be taken seriously. 59 Indeed, the concept of universality of human rights is often employed to serve the liberal vision of international human rights. One can see some truth in Makau Mutua's suggestion that "[t]he grand narrative of human rights contains a subtext that depicts an epochal contest pitting savages, on the one hand, against victims and saviors, on the other."
60 He asks the human rights movement to be more self-critical and to "come to terms with the troubling rhetoric and history that shape, in part, the human rights movement."
61
Questioning universalism, Abdullahi An-Na'im believes that "the vision of universality of human rights is fundamentally challenging to all societies and all human beings," by the true dimension and the true nature of the claim of universality of human rights.
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Human beings who are the subject of human rights must be the authors of what those rights are and must be the primary actors in realizing these rights. So to the extent that what we have been doing so far is marginalize major sections of humanity from the exercise and the process of defining what human rights are and of realizing them, the very pretense that we can defend other peoples' human rights is really an afront to the claim of universality, because it has to be the person herself or himself who articulate what they see to be their rights and also how to go about protecting them."
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This is what he calls the double paradox of universality: how to realize a shared understanding of human rights with the reality of fundamental dif- ferences. An-Na'im has also argued that "what we" call human rights now is a now a "variety of the civilized mission of the white man." 64 The inclusive, unstructured approach with no pre-determined grand theory of human rights that McCrudden advocates for seems to address such criticisms without rejecting the importance of universality. McCrudden notes that the structure, the content, the methods, and the theoretical underpinnings of human rights are all contested. Focusing on human rights and the courts, he maintains that human rights law is:
[T]he result of claims involving competing and, sometimes, incompatible substantive values, each supported by credible human rights sources and interpretations. Human rights, as interpreted by the courts, function in apparently contradictory ways: they look forward but also backward; they appeal to both communitarian and individualistic values; they juggle both the particular and the universal; they struggle between continuity and change; they empower the state, and they challenge its power.
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These ideas can also be applied to the matter in question. Universalism is indeed one of the core principles of human rights. However, it would be dangerous to make the recognition of cultural rights dependent on a notion of universalism, especially since the final authoritative decision maker is quite often not the affected party.
When the majority of powerful, European states have repeatedly shunned collective notions of cultural rights, which seriously affects the identity of millions of persons belonging to minority and indigenous groups, recommendations to states to support universalism must be followed by equally strong messages for collective cultural rights. Otherwise, the quest for universalism may be used as a smokescreen for the denial of cultural rights to non-state groups.
V. SPECIFICALLY ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS: FEMINIST CONSIDERATIONS
First wave feminist scholars have been quite vocal in emphasizing the primacy of women's rights when faced with cultural claims. It was agreed that moving away from universal claims on equality and focusing on a particular, Western understanding of equality would be detrimental to feminism; these foundations must be critically accepted. 66 However, these feminist approaches were confronted by subsequent feminist voices. "Black feminism, critical race feminism, postcolonial feminism, and even religious feminism have staked out epistemological authority and ground in the last three decades, demanding inclusion in feminist debates and questioning dominant liberal feminist representations." 67 The appropriation of the experiences of subaltern women and their struggles by "hegemonic white women's movements" 68 has been criticized. Valerie Amos and Pratibha Parmar note that: "Feminist theories which examine our cultural practices as 'feudal residues' or label us 'traditional,' also portray us as politically immature women who need to be versed and schooled in the ethos of Western Feminism. They need to be continually challenged." 69 Unfortunately, the recent migration challenge has meant that a secular, universalist trend of feminism has become more popular. Nilüger Göle and Julie Billaud note the irony in this: [G] iven that feminism has initiated a criticism and disrupted frames of universalist definitions of gender. Through deconstructing the commonly held idea that difference between sexes has been mainly due to biology, feminists have (. . .) shown that the abstract individualism used as the basis for citizenship and equality, especially in France, could not grant their active participation in society as autonomous citizens. On the contrary, they have argued that universalism has excluded women from the political arena.
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Insisting on this abstract individualism as the only principle when balancing cultural rights and women's rights is problematic. In this debate, intersectionality is a useful consideration. 71 First coined by Kimberle Crenshaw, intersectionality has challenged the traditional belief that discrimination is a single categorical axis. 72 Crenshaw has explained that gender and racial discrimination mutually reinforce and intersect to shape structural and political oppression against women of color. 73 Owing to their many identities, minority women suffer a unique form of discrimination, which is seldom recognized and addressed within the law. This short-sighted critique of nonliberal feminism has been criticized; started by social justice bloggers, the phrase "check your privilege" has become a hit, especially among young 67 activists. 74 It reflects the reality that mainstream feminism remains dominated by voices and understandings formulated by privileged, Western women. In fact, many academics, such as Johanna Bond and Aisha Davis, have advised that the protection of current international law to women predisposed to intersectional discrimination is rather inadequate. 75 Human rights bodies are still reflecting on how to implement intersectionality in a system that is based on single treaties. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) General Recommendation 28 recognized that "gender is inextricably linked with other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, class . . . sexual orientation and gender identity." 76 Bond has argued that CEDAW offers protection to a monolithic category of women 77 that solely face gender discrimination. The Human Rights Committee also noted in General Comment 28 on Article 3 that discrimination against women is often "intertwined with discrimination on other grounds." 78 In its General Recommendation 25, The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) addressed the relevance of gender in racial discrimination 79 and committed to integrate gender analysis into their work. 80 However, beyond these initiatives, intersectionality continues to be in the periphery of international human rights work. Rauna Kuokkanen discusses how intersectionality was missing in the focused discussion on indigenous women at the 2004 Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues: "Neither the report nor the summary explores the ways in which Indigeneity and gender intersect in the lives of Indigenous women and exacerbate the discrimination and subordination that they may face." 
VI. INDIGENOUS WOMEN AND INDIGENOUS CULTURES: THE UNDRIP
In ways similar to migrant, refugee, and minority women, indigenous women suffer from both gender discrimination and colonial perceptions of their cultures. They are a good case study to highlight how cultural rights and women's rights are interwoven in some women's experiences and cannot be separated. As Radhika Coomaraswamy has noted, "[f]ighting prejudice against underprivileged groups while struggling for women's empowerment goes to the heart of the modern dilemma between the universalism of human rights and the particularity of cultural experience."
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Cheryl Suzack has identified three ways in which indigenous women still have an inferior status in international human rights law: (1) when international networks require indigenous women to choose between being women or being indigenous people; (2) when courts of law apply equality jurisprudence to indigenous peoples without acknowledging the colonial law context, or that equality legislation may not be the most effective means of understanding their gender discrimination experiences; and (3) when competing political agendas force women to address their issues indirectly or risk dividing social movements. 83 These considerations are at the core of a pseudo-choice indigenous women have between promoting their cultural rights or their women's rights. Attempts to improve their situation through women's rights are likely to include remnants of colonialism; attempts to ignore their gender and focus on the attacks-direct and indirect-to their cultural rights will continue their oppression.
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Both indigenous cultural rights and indigenous women's rights are recognized in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). The freedom of indigenous peoples to have their indigenous identities and cultures respected has been the main incentive for their struggle and one of the main reasons for the adoption of UNDRIP. 85 Aspects of indigenous cultural rights can be found throughout the text of UNDRIP; however, the articles that focus on cultural rights are Articles 11 to 13, together with Articles 15 and 34. Articles 11 to 13 distinguish between indigenous tangible heritage (Article 11); indigenous traditions and customs (Article 11); the spiritual and 
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UNDRIP includes three articles that focus on the rights of women. Article 21(2) calls for states to take effective measures to ensure the improvement of indigenous peoples' economic and social conditions while paying particular attention to "the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities." 87 Article 22(1) reiterates the need to attend to "the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities" in implementing UNDRIP. Article 22(2) calls for states, "in conjunction with indigenous peoples, to ensure that indigenous women and children enjoy the full protection and guarantees against all forms of violence and discrimination." 88 Finally, Article 44 states that UNDRIP applies equally to "male and female indigenous individuals." 89 The tendency of UNDRIP to categorize women together with children and disabled persons undermines the rights of these women, as it portrays them as vulnerable individuals-victims who cannot defend themselves or care for their own needs.
Indigenous cultural rights often need balancing with indigenous women's rights, and international human rights law has a clear method of balancing competing rights. First, non-derogable rights cannot be subjected to any balancing; the right to life, the right to be free from torture and other inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, the right to be free from slavery or servitude, and the right to be free from retroactive application of penal laws cannot be curtailed. Additionally, no cultural practices and beliefs can violate these values and no real adjustment can be initiated to these rights. Subsidiarity cannot be applied here. It is not up to the group to decide on these practices. The practices must be eliminated, even if seen as expressions of some cultures or even when accepted by the women of the group. Hence, "family violence and abuse, [including] forced marriage, dowry deaths, [and] acid attacks" are unacceptable practices and cannot be justified in the name of any culture or cultural right. 90 Also, the core of 91 stems from the belief that the international community operates "as a society of societies, with its own public culture and conception of public reason" 92 and is expressed in international decisions, including treaties, customary law, general principles, and soft law.
At the same time, UNDRIP and international human rights law in general do not adopt any other kind of hierarchy. Any conflicts between rights, principles, and norms are generally solved on an ad hoc basis, after taking into account various considerations. UNDRIP confirms the ad hoc method by insisting that indigenous rights are firmly within the wider human rights system and, as such, are subject to the same restrictions as other human rights. UNDRIP links its content with the "purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations," 93 while Article 1 UNDRIP links the text with the Charter, the UN Declaration on Human Rights, and international human rights law. Article 46 UNDRIP notes that in exercising the rights contained within the text, "human rights and fundamental freedoms of all shall be respected. The exercise of the rights set forth in this Declaration shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law and in accordance with international human rights obligations." 94 The same applies for the rights of all minority women, based on Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 95 In making these decisions, UN bodies have insisted on specific principles. In Lovelace v. Canada, 96 Kitok v. Sweden, 97 and Länsman v. Finland, 98 the Human Rights Committee asked for the existence of a reasonable and objective justification for the prevalence of one right over the other; consistency with human rights instruments; the necessity of the restriction; and proportionality. It is argued that the complete neglect of one right-cultural right or individual right-for the full realization of the competing right would, in most cases, violate the principle of necessity. 99 Importantly, UNDRIP also urges conflicts of rights to be "interpreted in accordance with the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality, non-discrimination, good governance and good faith." 100 UNDRIP highlights the importance of interpreting the text and the principles that will be used when applying the provisions.
VII. APPLYING THE LAW: SOFT UNIVERSALITY AND SUBSIDIARITY
Absolute universalism was used in the elaboration of UNDRIP as a means to restrict indigenous rights by employing the false dichotomy between collective rights versus individual rights. The US, UK, and France "remained concerned about the possible confusion between individual and collective rights." 101 Australia stated that "[t]he concept of a collective right was not recognized in domestic or international legal systems at present." 102 After the adoption of UNDRIP, Japan and the UK also proclaimed that they did not "accept the concept of collective human rights in international law." 103 Other states expressed their specific concerns with respect to women's rights. 104 A solution repeatedly suggested by the US was the adoption of a language similar to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, whereby persons may enjoy human rights individually, and these may be exercised individually or in community with others, 105 a clear restriction of the already existing indigenous rights at the time. Within this framework, the reluctance of indigenous movements to talk about the rights of indigenous women is fully justified.
Refusal to understand culture as one of the principal values of indigenous women would fail to redress the disrespect that indigenous communities have experienced toward their identities. A system of absolute universalism would put the maintenance and coherence of a liberal, individualistically perceived system of human rights above the needs of indigenous women around the world. It would mean submitting human rights to the oppression of a Western jurisprudential viewpoint. Ultimately, this would not serve the quest for global justice. It would treat indigenous viewpoints and philosophies as inferior to liberal ideas. The international community refused acknowledge the needs of indigenous peoples and UNDRIP was adopted with a very strong collective element.
The ideals of justice also dictate that the voices of indigenous women, rather than all women, should be the loudest, when discussing the balancing of indigenous women's rights and cultural rights. Indigenous scholars have argued that the traditional feminist language is "inauthentic, un-Aboriginal and in other ways deeply problematic for Indigenous peoples." 106 Indigenous feminists argue that not only do they have to challenge "patriarchy within Native communities, but also white supremacy and colonialism within mainstream white feminism." 107 The responsibility of the non-indigenous society and the state during the emergence of illiberal practices in indigenous communities should also not be undermined. Native scholars highlight the role that Western colonialism has played in the current sex-based oppression in indigenous communities. They argue that such ideas were imported, 108 and that they derive from the hierarchical nature of Western society and its valuing of all structures in a binary manner. 109 At times, the differences between the women's indigenous movement and the feminist movement are obvious: the 1995 Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing saw a "contradictory and often conflictual relationship between feminist organizations and female indigenous representatives," 110 as indigenous women were pushing for a different agenda than feminists. Scholars have highlighted that the focus of the international women's movement on gender discrimination tends to emphasize individual equality and rights rather than the effects of structural violence on women's lives. The International Indigenous Women's Forum (FIMI) argued in 1996 that "flawed assumptions that operate within the global women's movement" mean that its strategy for gendered violence is not appropriate for indigenous women. 111 In concluding, UNDRIP recognizes the merit of universal values, and in applying such values, it gives primary position to the particularities of indigenous individuals and communities. Who will decide in each case whether the cultural practice violates women's rights is essential in the process of balancing cultural rights and women's rights. If the practice contravenes non-derogable rights such as the prohibition against torture, the right to life, and the core of human rights, then there is no space for particularities: the practice will have to stop. But in all other cases, subsidiarity, namely the idea that the legitimate authority of smaller communities must be protected by larger communities, is helpful. Human beings flourish when they actively participate in realizing their own good, not when they are treated as mere observers of the decision-making processes without involvement.
112 James Anaya has stated that any assessment about a cultural practice must allow a certain deference for the group's "own interpretive and decision-making processes in the application of universal human rights norms, just as states are accorded such deference." 113 This would confirm the respect that the international community has toward the indigenous group. However, the idea that in-groups will have the first say on whether their practices violate human rights has proven to be controversial. 114 Madhavi Sunder urges the state's or international community's interference, and notes that many "women argue that their governments-and the international human rights community-have improperly deferred to traditionalists and so-called cultural leaders' interpretations of private laws without taking proper account of modernizing views." 115 The earlier discussion on indigenous feminism leads to only one answer: the group that will decide in these cases must only be the indigenous women of the group. Subsidiarity applied, the decision will not be made by the international community, state, nor the group as a whole, but by the actual women who are affected by the practice in question. This choice must be real. Richards has noted that "[e]ven when indigenous women are physically present at debates about human rights, their unique positions are frequently marginalized by those who set the terms of discussion." 116 It is important that the indigenous women reach their decisions about the future of a practice without inappropriate interference. Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, women who have the courage to criticize their communities are sometimes seen as betraying the indigenous cause and their authenticity as indigenous is questioned. 117 Similarly, it is important that these decisions about the validity of the practice and custom, their priorities, and the way to eradicate such practice are respected, even if such decisions go against the feminist ideal. It is essential that they are not labelled as victims of culturally generated false consciousness in need of liberation. 118 It has been argued in the past that real choices can only be made if the women in question have the right to leave the group. 119 Marilyn Friedman created a test to determine whether individuals within groups have made their decision freely. 120 They must "be able to choose among a significant and morally acceptable array of alternatives." They must "be able to make their own choices relatively free of coercion, manipulation, and deception." Additionally, they must "have been able to develop, earlier in life, the capacities needed to reflect on their situations and make decisions about them." 121 Leaving the group is very difficult in a culture where the community is so crucial to the individual's identity. However, even with this fact aside, the socio-economic situation of most indigenous women would not allow them acknowledge the possibility of leaving if they wanted. If an indigenous woman has been denied education, literacy, and the right to learn about the world outside the group, she does not really have "a substantial freedom to leave because she lacks the preconditions-knowledge and experience-for making a meaningful choice." 122 Equally importantly, the right to exit puts the onus on the indigenous woman; it is the woman who has to leave and abandon her membership and group. 123 Ultimately, such a solution seems to sidetrack the problem as it maintains "a systematic and structural problem" 124 within the indigenous group. For these reasons, Jeff Spinner-Halev sets some minimal standards, similar to the Friedman Test, which are needed to ensure that exit is really an option. According to him, "[t]hese standards include freedom from physical abuse, decent health care and nutrition, the ability to socialize with others, a minimal education . . . and a mainstream liberal society." 125 For this reason, freedom from violence takes priority among indigenous women over discriminatory practices, because violence hinders any further promotion of indigenous women's rights. Also, the reality is that in several places, indigenous women "often lack access to education, health care and ancestral lands, [and] face disproportionately high rates of poverty and are subjected to violence, such as domestic violence and sexual abuse, including in the contexts of trafficking and armed conflict." 126 At this point, the state does have an important role to play. By improving socio-economic rights of indigenous women in a culturally sensitive way, the state empowers the women to act on the illiberal practices. In contrast, by undermining the cultural rights of indigenous peoples, the state also undermines the identities of indigenous women which disempowers them and ultimately harms any real change. Also, in considering the restriction of cultural rights in the name of gender equality, the above considerations will have to be taken into account in order to decide whether a pressing need exists for the interference and whether the interference to cultural rights is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
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VIII. A PARADIGM SHIFT: FROM VICTIMHOOD TO EMPOWERMENT
Women's empowerment was articulated in the 1980s and 1990s as a grassroots approach that was mainly concerned with challenging unequal gender relations. 128 The above analysis demonstrates the importance of the empowerment of migrant, minority and indigenous women, women whose cultures and tradition are important to their own sense of identity. 129 Such empowerment is a game-changer; from being seen as vulnerable individuals in need of an outside voice to protect their rights, their empowerment allows us to hear their own voice. In turn, this allows them to make their own paths and decide on their own strategies and priorities. At the same time, we should take seriously Yuval-Davis's caution about empowerment narratives and avoid "simplistic notions of empowerment based on identity politics which homogenize and naturalize social categories and groupings and which deny shifting boundaries as well as internal power differences and conflicts of interest." 130 In the last few years, the World Bank has greatly embraced (or co-opted) the human rights discourse to promote initiatives related to financial and economic inclusion of women. With respect to indigenous women, several initiatives have also recently been taken that change the narrative from victims to empowered leaders. Asian Indigenous Women have noted in the Baguio Declaration of the Second Asian Indigenous Women's Conference:
We accept the challenge and responsibility to address cultural renewal and revitalization to promote gender-sensitive values and structures within our communities. . . . We will speak up against abusive treatment of indigenous women in the name of custom and tradition. 131 The 2013 World Conference of Indigenous Women, attended by 300 indigenous women from all over the world, solidified the right to selfdetermination, "including the vital role of Indigenous women, in all matters related to our own human rights, political status, and well-being." 132 The Conference affirmed:
Indigenous women have knowledge, wisdom, and practical experience, which has sustained human societies over generations. We, as mothers, life givers, culture bearers, and economic providers, nurture the linkages across generations and are the active sources of continuity and positive change. 133 In the final document emerging from this Conference, which was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly, 134 different organs of the UN system, including in particular the Commission on the Status of Women, were expressly invited to consider the issue of indigenous women's empowerment at a future period of sessions. 135 Women have a greater role to play in cultural activities; the UN Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights has commented on the "pervasive gender discrimination" in cultural activities. 136 Women should not only be seen as carriers of the culture, but also as active participants in the development of their culture and in socially engaged cultural initiatives. An interesting example is that of the mola production of the indigenous Kuna women, which are handmade appliqué panels worn on traditional blouses that are deeply tied to Kuna people's history and identity. After years of unsuccessful attempts to stop the commercial imitation mola, Law 20 was passed. 137 However, it was men who were involved in representing the Kunas in relevant disputes, whereas it was the Kuna women who were producing the mola. The recent establishment of a General Congress of Kuna Women has addressed the issue of women's representation and hopefully will strike a balance. 138 Indeed, women also change the culture of their groups through social enterprise activities that work as a way to restrict male domination within their communities. 139 In Latin America, indigenous women have renewed their commitment to political empowerment. 140 Sámi women have also used their culture for their empowerment. Sanna Valkonen and Sandra WalleniusKorkalo have demonstrated how "[t]he relevance of the cultural practices and mental structures of Sáminess as forms of resilience enables Sámi women to overstep the traditional subject positions of Laestadian women." 141 In other words, their indigenousness has given them the tools to stand up to values that restrict their role and assert themselves. After engaging in qualitative research, Valkonen and Wallenius-Korkalo agree with my line of thought when they note that "[c]ontextual and historical awareness calls for sensitivity, a critical realisation that one must not make any category-Sámi identity, religiousness, gender-the sole frame of reference when working with the Sámi." 142 Universalistic, postcolonial feminist considerations all contribute to understanding their experiences and protecting their rights.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The recent tide against cultural rights in the name of protecting women's rights harms, rather than enhances refugee, migrant, minority, and indigenous women's rights. This article used cross-disciplinary scholarship to address the concerns on the hegemonic and exclusive nature of universalism. I used the example of indigenous women to argue that the realization of universal human rights can only really happen if both collective cultural rights and individual rights of women are recognized. Working towards the implementation of both cultural and individual rights to the degree that the specific women see appropriate is the only way that is culturally sensitive and protects women's intersectional identities. Framing discussions in the binary way of cultural rights versus women's rights neglects the real, multiple identities of women. The decolonization of international human rights law points toward accepting that rights are indeed universal, but also recognizing that the way such standards apply must take into account the particular priorities and strategies of the affected women. Balancing different rights and needs can only be effective if the women in question feel strong enough to make such decisions. This may happen if they are partners in their societies and are seen as such by their wider respective societies. Accepting and strengthening their identities and improving the socio-economic rights that empower them is a solid first step.
